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Professor Stephen Ellmann
PROFESSOR ELLMANN:* It's an honor to be on this panel with my
colleague Ruti Teitel, with whom I share many interests and concerns,
and, of course, with Justice Goldstone, whose role in South Africa and
in the world exemplifies what a single person can do against injustice
and also reflects an odd but not novel fact-that there are times when
grotesque oppression breeds tremendous human creativity. We've
seen that, I suppose, in the Russian novels written under the Czar;
more recently, we've seen it in the struggle for human rights and
equality in South Africa over the past decades. So it is an honor to be
with one of the leaders of an extraordinary group.
I also think it's appropriate that we are here today, in a week
when many of us have been celebrating Easter or Passover stories of
redemption, of reconciliation, and of new hope. There is indeed hope,
as Justice Goldstone has said, and the progress toward an International
Criminal Court is one reason for it. This afternoon, however, I want
to talk about another of the possible lessons of the tremendous
creativity of the South African human rights struggles - .the lesson
embodied in the amnesty granted in South Africa for the wrongs of
the past - and to ask how that lesson intersects with the lessons about
the need for the International Criminal Court.
I agree completely with what Justice Goldstone has said about
the tremendous human achievement in the rise of international human
rights law. I agree just as completely that converting that law from
elaborate expressions of principle to enforceable norms and duties is
essential; and I agree, as well, that an International Criminal Court
would be a tremendous asset in achieving that conversion of good talk
into good action.
Yet, of course, what international criminal courts, like
domestic criminal courts, do is to prosecute and punish. In the course
of the negotiations to frame the international criminal court statute,
there has evidently been some consideration of the possibility of
pardons after conviction and sentencing, but I take it there is no
' Professor Ellmann wishes to thank Paul Dubinsky and Nancy Rosenbloom
for comments on an earlier draft of these remarks.
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reason to doubt that the point of having the court is not to achieve the
pardons. 2
So I want to talk about a country, again Justice Goldstone's
country, where pardons, or rather amnesties, have become a central
part of policy. Now I talk about this, of course, as an American, and I
very much hope that Justice Goldstone will speak as he can to these
events himself.
But given that caveat, let me turn to what other South Africans
have said about amnesty. The South Africans I have in mind are
Justice Goldstone's colleagues, the other judges of the Constitutional
Court, who addressed the constitutionality of South Africa's amnesty
law in the case of AZAPO v. President of South Africa.33(Justice
Goldstone did not sit on this particular case). The Constitutional
Court was called upon in AZAPO to decide whether amnesty could be
constitutional under a constitution which rightly and appropriately
guarantees all victims access to courts-precisely what an amnesty
denies.
In one sense, this was actually an easy question, because the
South African interim constitution, and now its final constitution,
provides that there shall be an amnesty. Neither text, however,
specifies exactly what the amnesty shall be. The harder question,
therefore, was whether the particular amnesty law written in South
Africa was constitutional.
What this law provides is that when the conditions set for
getting amnesty are satisfied, then the wrongdoer will receive
amnesty.34  This amnesty confers on the wrongdoer complete
immunity from criminal or civil liability, and the state itself is
immunized from civil liability for the past wrongdoings of its agents.
32 The statute as finally adopted does not provide for pardons. Rome Statute
of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), available
in United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an
International Criminal Court (visited March 23, 1999) <http://www.un.org/law/icc/
n9828144.pdf>.
33 Azanian Peoples Organisation (AZAPO) and Others v. President'of the
Republic of South Africa and Others, 1996 (4) SALR 671 (CC). Also available in Wits
Law School Constitutional Law Archive, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg
(visited March 23, 1999) <http://www.law.wits.ac.za/judgements/azapo.html>.
34 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliati6n Act 34 of 1995, § 20(1).
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That's a thoroughgoing amnesty. And it's fair to say that it denies a
lot of people at least the aspiration to go to court to address the
wrongs done to them.
Yet the Constitutional Court unanimously held that this law
was constitutional.35 The reasons for that judgment are many, and I
don't mean to cite chapter and verse, but I want to try to give at least a
brief account of what the court viewed as the reasons for this
departure from the principle of punishment for wrongdoing. 36
One consideration was that part of what victims want is
something they need before they can get punishment or vengeance.
They want knowledge. They want to know what happened. As the
Constitutional Court said, given the realities of the human rights
abuses of the country's past, finding out what happened is very
difficult and indeed may be impossible unless the perpetrators know
that when they admit what they did, they get off scot-free.
A second consideration, and in a sense a much more
pragmatic one, is that amnesty was the price for a peaceful transition
from apartheid to democracy. South Africa's new constitution
empowers its people. But those who surrendered their power or much
of their power did not do so altogether joyfully and might not have
done so at all had they known that they were surrendering power not
just to people who had assumed their offices but who would in due
course send them to prison.
Third, on quite a different note, let me read a very short
segment of the first post-apartheid South African constitution. This is
from what's sometimes called the epilogue or the post-amble to the
interim constitution, a series of paragraphs headed "National Unity
and Reconciliation" which include the paragraph calling for an
amnesty.37 Right before the amnesty paragraph comes a sentence
declaring that the gross violations of human rights in South Africa's
past:
35 One justice, the late John Didcott, reached this conclusion for somewhat
different reasons than those accepted by the rest of the Court. See AZAPO, 1996 (4)
SALR at 698 (judgment of Didcott, J.).36 See AZAPO, 1996 (4) SALR at 683-86 (judgment of Mahomed, DP).
37 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 200 of 1993 (the Interim
Constitution), Epilogue on 'National Unity and Reconciliation.'
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can now be addressed on the basis that there is a need
for understanding but not for vengeance, a need for
reparation but not for retaliation, a need for ubuntu [an
African term meaning, very approximately,
personhood in community38] but not for victimization.
What this idealistic language teaches us is that amnesty wasn't
just a pragmatic surrender to the outgoing holders of power or even a
clever response to the problem of discovering the truth. The grant of
amnesty was in part a judgment that what was needed in South Africa
was not more punishment but more reconciliation.
Now, I should be careful to say that this amnesty, though
available, does not come free. To get an amnesty, what the
perpetrator of gross human rights abuses must do is to admit those
abuses fully. In addition, such a wrongdoer must face his victims at a
hearing, ordinarily a hearing held in public. 39 This is not necessarily a
simple, routine or pleasant experience. The new nation and the
individual victims can obtain not just facts but also perhaps some
additional measure of retribution or atonement-though not damages,
and not jail time, and not even necessarily apologies-in the
process. 40 But with that deal, South Africa has embarked on granting
amnesty, I think, in a very wide-ranging way.
4
.
38 See S v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SALR 391, 501 (CC)
(judgment of Mokgoro, J.) (explaining the meaning of ubuntu).
39 Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995, §§ 18(4)
20(l)(c) & 33(1).
40 Id. §§ 3(1)(c), 23-27. Though damages are not available, the Act does
contemplate payment of reparations by the State. Id.
4 1 By no means has everyone who has applied for amnesty received it, as my
students have emphasized to me. As of December 9, 1998, in fact, only 216 amnesty
applications had been granted in full, out of 4,774 that had been dealt with by that time.
See Truth & Reconciliation Commission, Truth-The Road to Reconciliation (unofficial
website on Truth & Reconciliation Commission Work, visited April 23, 1999)
<http://www.truth.org.za/amnesty.htm>. At least 3,198 of these applications were refused
either in whole or in part because the applicants did not show that their acts had a political
objective, as the amnesty law requires. Id; for the multilayered criteria for establishing
this political connection, see Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of
1995, §§ 20(2) & (3).
But it is also clear that amnesty has been granted for many terrible crimes,
including bombings, murders and torture, where the Amnesty Committee has been
satisfied that the offenses have been fully revealed and'are genuinely connected to
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Even if South Africa's experience provides evidence of the
value of amnesties in some circumstances, it might be argued that
those circumstances are limited. Perhaps it is only in a country
emerging from its own nightmare of past human rights abuses that
there is any reason to talk in terms such as those the South African
Constitutional Court uses and I've tried to recount. But I think in fact
the occasions for amnesty might extend to international wrongs as
well as intranational ones.
Consider a situation that I hope is usually only hypothetical:
suppose that two opposing armies wage a war which over a period of
time degenerates into such savagery that neither side takes prisoners.
Vast numbers of people in these armies must be guilty of killing
soldiers who had surrendered-at least as long as any soldiers did try
to surrender. Now, that's a war crime, and will be punishable before
the International Criminal Court.42 Yet one might think that possibly
in some such wars, at the end the opposing armies and their hopefully
civilian leaders might say that the best course for them all is to forgive
and if not forget, at least move on, rather than to launch, after the end
of battle hostilities, a program of legal hostilities as well.
I don't insist on those conclusions. I don't insist that South
Africa should have decided to adopt an amnesty or that warring
parties should adopt amnesty. I do think there are a number of cases
in the world where conflicting parties have decided to grant amnesty.
And that leads to the question of whether there is a way to have an
International Criminal Court without preventing countries that want to
pursue amnesty instead of prosecution from doing just that.
This is not a simple matter. If the International Criminal
Court had been in existence at the time the human rights abuses now
being amnestied in South Africa were committed, then those
politics. See, e.g., Amnesty Decision: Benzien, available on Truth & Reconciliation
Commission, Truth-The Road to Reconciliation (visited April 23, 1999)
<http://www.truth.org~za/amnesty/77.htm> (granting amnesty to security policeman for
trorture and other crimes); Amnesty Decision: Ntamo, Peni, Nofemela & Manqina,
available on Truth and Reconciliation Commission, Truth-The Road to Reconciliation
(visited April 23, 1999) <http://www.truth.org.za/amnesty/61.htm> (granting amnesty to
black youths who murdered a white anti-apartheid activist, Amy Biehl).
42 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8 (2)(b)(vi) and (xii),
U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998).
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amnesties might well be of no force. I say this because South Africa's
grants of amnesty would seem to demonstrate an unwillingness to
prosecute those amnestied, and when a state that is a party to the
International Criminal Court statute and has jurisdiction to prosecute
is unwilling to exercise its jurisdiction the International Criminal
Court would be empowered to act.43 There is good reason to prevent
states from simply covering up human rights abuses, or from unjustly
protecting abusers from prosecution, but if we do not reject amnesty
altogether, then we need a way to protect rightful amnesties from
complete international override.
One way to harmonize principles of amnesty and prosecution
would be to confine International Criminal Court jurisdiction to a set
of crimes so horrible that no amnesty could ever be conceivable for
them. Only lesser crimes would be eligible for amnesties granted by
the state or states concerned. It might be argued that this is exactly
what the Statute has done, since it empowers the Court to act only
with respect to genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and
aggression. 4 But this list is not as short as it might seem. For
example, it surely includes many of the crimes for which amnesty is
now possible in South Africa, for the statute includes among crimes
against humanity "the crime of apartheid." 45 The reach of the statute
as it stands is broad enough to include crimes, horrible crimes, for
which amnesty could nevertheless be an appropriate response.
The possibility of amnesty may still be preserved by the
International Criminal Court Statute's provision for "deferral of
investigation or prosecution" on request from the United Nations
Security Council.46 Deferral lasts for 12 months, and the Security
Council can renew its request, perhaps indefinitely. Whether or not it
is desirable for the power politics of the Security Council to trump the
deliberations of the International Criminal Court, however, deferral is
41 See id. art. 17(1) (making cases "inadmissible" before the International
Criminal Court if they are being or have been investigated by a state with jurisdiction
over them, unless the state is unwilling or unable to genuinely prosecute); cf id., art.
89(l) (requiring states to cooperate in arresting and surrendering persons in their territory,
on request of the International Criminal Court).
44 Id., art. 5 (1) (a-d).
41 See id. art. 7(l)(j) & 7(2)(h).
46 See id. art. 16.
1999] 261
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
not explicitly an amnesty system. By its terms, the deferral provision
neither authorizes permanent amnesties nor provides any standards for
deciding when to do SO.
4 7
I suggest, instead, that the Statute ought to provide that the
International Criminal Court will not pursue cases where doing so
would breach a valid amnesty. This proposal, of course, would require
distinguishing between "valid" and "invalid" amnesties. This is a
difficult task, but not an impossible one. Indeed, South Africa's
example again offers useful guidance. We might fairly say that a valid
amnesty is, like South Africa's, one that satisfies three conditions:
first, it has been agreed to by the parties most directly concerned;
second, that agreement is not simply an oppressive element of a
"victor's peace"; and third, the amnesty does provide victims of
human rights abuses with some meaningful form of recognition,
satisfaction and redress.
Perhaps such a proposal would enable these two great modem
impulses of human rights law-punishment and reconciliation-
simultaneously to achieve recognition.
Professor Ruti Teitel
PROFESSOR TEITEL: It is a pleasure to have the opportunity to
engage in this discussion with Justice Goldstone. We are in debt to
him for the historical sweep and ethical force of his remarks.
I would like to follow up on some of the thoughts raised in the
narrative that Justice Goldstone has put forth here today. In his
words, the narrative of justice in this century is "paradoxical."
47 Another route to a form of amnesty lies in the discretionary power of the
Court's Prosecutor to refrain from initiating an investigation or undertaking a prosecution,
in light of "the interests of justice," including such factors as "the gravity of the crime and
the interests of victims." Id. art. 53(I)(c) & (2)(c). These provisions can be read simply
to authorize familiar acts of individualized prosecutorial discretion, though they could
also encompass a prosecutorial decision to forego a wider range of prosecutions in light
of considerations including the possibility of reconciliation. The language surely is not
intended, however, to authorize-much less require-a program as generous as South
Africa's. On the contrary, the provision for review of such decisions by the Court, id. art
53(3), suggests the drafters' desire to cabin the prosecutor's power not to prosecute.
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